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Fictitious Play with Time-Invariant Frequency Update
for Network Security
Kien C. Nguyen, Tansu Alpcan, and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract— We study two-player security games which can
be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played
by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game
is based on a stochastic fictitious play process, where players
do not have access to each other’s payoff matrix. Each has to
observe the other’s actions up to present and plays the action
generated based on the best response to these observations. In a
regular fictitious play process, each player makes a maximum
likelihood estimate of her opponent’s mixed strategy, which
results in a time-varying update based on the previous estimate
and current action. In this paper, we explore an alternative
scheme for frequency update, whose mean dynamic is instead
time-invariant. We examine convergence properties of the mean
dynamic of the fictitious play process with such an update
scheme, and establish local stability of the equilibrium point
when both players are restricted to two actions. We also propose
an adaptive algorithm based on this time-invariant frequency
update.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has recently been used as an effective tool
to model and solve many security problems in computer and
communication networks. In a noncooperative matrix game
between an Attacker and a Defender, if the payoff matrices
are assumed to be known to both players, each player can
compute the set of Nash equilibria of the game and play
one of these strategies to maximize her expected gain (or
minimize its expected loss). However, in practice, the players
do not necessarily have full knowledge of each other’s payoff
matrix. For repeated games, a mechanism called fictitious
play (FP) can be used for each player to learn her opponent’s
motivations. In a FP process, each player observes all the
actions and makes estimates of the mixed strategy of her
opponent. At each stage, she updates this estimate and plays
the pure strategy that is the best response (or generated based
on the best response) to the current estimate of the other’s
mixed strategy. It can be seen that in a FP process, if one
player plays a fixed strategy (either of the pure or mixed
type), the other player’s sequence of strategies will converge
to the best response to this fixed strategy. Furthermore, it
has been shown that, for many classes of games, such a
FP process will finally render both players playing a Nash
equilibrium (NE).
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Specifically, we examine a two-player game, where an
Attacker (denoted as player 1 or P1) and a Defender (denoted
as player 2 or P2) participate in a discrete-time repeated
nonzero-sum matrix game. In a general setting, the Attacker
has m possible actions and the Defender has n posssible
actions to choose from. For example, when m = n = 2, the
Attacker’s actions could be to attack one node in a two-node
network, and those of the Defender are to defend one of
these two nodes. Players do not have access to each other’s
payoff function. They adjust their strategies based on each
other’s actions which they observe.
In a stochastic FP process, each player makes a maximum
likelihood estimation of her opponent’s mixed strategy. As
will be seen later on, this will result in a time-varying update
of the opponent’s empirical frequency, where the weight of
the action at time step k is 1/k. In a practical repeated
security game, however, we notice a couple of possible
complications. First, players may not have the exact and
synchronized time steps. Second, each player may want to
adjust the weight of the other’s current action to converge
either faster or more accurately to the equilibrium. A more
flexible scheme to update the estimate of the mixed strategy
may be needed in such situations. Motivated by these practi-
cal considerations, we examine in this paper a time-invariant
frequency update mechanism for fictitious play. Also, as a
side note, such a time-invariant update mechanism will allow
us to use the analysis tools applicable only to time-invariant
systems.
Security games have been examined extensively in a large
number of papers, see for example, [1], [2], [3], [7], [18],
[14]. Surveys on applications of game theory to network
security can be found in [6], [17]. Relevant literature on
fictitious play can be found in [16], [12], [5], [19], [20],
[11], [13], [15]. A comprehensive exposition of learning in
games can be found in [8].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we provide an overview of the static game and the standard
stochastic FP process, and then introduce the stochastic FP
with time-invariant frequency update. The analysis for FP
with time-invariant frequency update is given in Section III.
In Section IV, we introduce an adaptive algorithm based on
the time-invariant FP process. Next, simulation results are
given in Section V. Finally, some concluding remarks will
end the paper.
II. FICTITIOUS PLAY WITH TIME-INVARIANT
FREQUENCY UPDATE
In this Section, we present first an overview of a two-
player static games, then the concept of Stochastic Fictitious
Play with Time-Varying Frequency Update (TVFU-FP) [19],
[20], [13], [15], and finally the concept of Stochastic Ficti-
tious Play with Time-Invariant Frequency Update (TIFU-FP).
While we introduce both classical version and stochastic ver-
sion of static games, we restrict ourseves to only stochastic
fictitious play in Subsections II-B and II-C and in the rest of
the paper.
A. Static Games
We consider here static security games, where each player
Pi, i = 1, 2, has two possible actions (or pure strategies). We
use vi, to denote the action of Pi. Let ∆(2) be the simplex
in ℜ2, i.e.,
∆(2) ≡
{
s ∈ ℜ2|s1, s2 ≥ 0 and s1 + s2 = 1
}
. (1)
Each vi takes value in the set of (two) vertices of ∆(2):
vi = [1 0]
T for the first action, and vi = [0 1]T for the
second action. In a static game, player Pi selects an action
vi according to a mixed strategy pi ∈ ∆(2). The (instant)
payoff for player Pi is1 vTi Miv−i + τiH(pi), where Mi is
the payoff matrix of Pi, and H(pi) is the entropy of the
probability vector pi, H(pi) = −pTi log(pi). The weighted
entropy τiH(pi) with τi ≥ 0 is introduced to boost mixed
strategies. In a security game, τi signifies how much player
i wants to randomize its actions, and thus is not necessarily
known to the other player. Also, for τ1 = τ2 = 0 (referred
to as classical FP), the best response mapping can be set-
valued, while it has a unique value when τi > 0 (referred to
as stochastic FP). For a pair of mixed strategy (p1, p2), the
utility functions are given by the expected payoffs:
Ui(pi, p−i) = E
[
vTi Miv−i
]
+ τiH(pi)
= pTi Mip−i + τiH(pi). (2)
Now, the best response mappings βi : ∆(2) → ∆(2) are
defined as:
βi(p−i) = arg max
pi∈∆(2)
Ui(pi, p−i). (3)
If τi > 0, the best response is unique as mentioned earlier,
and is given by:
βi(p−i) = σ
(
Mip−i
τi
)
, (4)
where the soft-max function σ : ℜ2 → Interior(∆(2)) is
defined as
(σ(x))j =
exj
ex1 + ex2
, j = 1, 2. (5)
Note that (σ(x))j > 0, and thus the range of the soft-max
function is just the interior of the simplex.
1As standard in the game theory literature, the index −i is used to indicate
those of other players, or the opponent in this case.
Finally, a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is defined to
be a pair (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ ∆(2)×∆(2) such that for all pi ∈ ∆(2)
Ui(pi, p¯−i) ≤ Ui(p¯i, p¯−i). (6)
We can also write a Nash equilibrium (p¯1, p¯2) as the fixed
point of the best response mappings:
p¯i = βi(p¯−i), i = 1, 2. (7)
B. Stochastic Fictitious Play with Time-Varying Frequency
Update
From the static game described in Subsection II-A, we
define the discrete-time TVFU-FP as follows. Suppose that
the game is repeated at times k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. The empirical
frequency qi(k) of player Pi is given by
qi(k + 1) =
1
k + 1
k∑
j=0
vi(j). (8)
Using induction, we can prove the following recursive rela-
tion:
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
vi(k). (9)
From the equations of discrete-time TVFU-FP (8), (9), the
continuous-time version of the iteration can be written down
as follows [13]:
p˙i(t) = βi(p−i(t))− pi(t), i = 1, 2. (10)
C. Stochastic Fictitious Play with Time-Invariant Frequency
Update
In TVFU-FP, players take the maximum likelihood es-
timate of the mixed strategy of their opponent (8), (9).
In TIFU-FP, the estimates of the mixed strategies will be
calculated in a time-invariant manner as follows:
ri(1) = vi(0), (11)
ri(k + 1) = (1 − η)ri(k) + ηvi(k), (12)
where η is a constant and 0 < η < 1. For each player, this
is basically the exponential smoothing formula used in time
series analysis (See for example [9]). We will prove that
with this formulation, at time k, ri(k) will be a weighted
average of all the actions up to present of player i where
more recent actions have higher weights. Suppose that the
payoff matrices of player 1 and player 2 are, respectively,
M1 =
(
a b
c d
)
, M2 =
(
e g
f h
)
. (13)
Assumption 1: Based on a realistic security game, we can
make the following assumptions:
• a < c: When the Defender defends, the payoff of the
Attacker will be decreased if it attacks.
• b > d: When the Defender does not defend, the payoff
of the Attacker will be increased if it attacks.
• e > f : When the Attacker attacks, the payoff of the
Defender will be decreased if it does not defend.
• g < h: When the Attacker does not attack, the payoff
of the Defender will be increased if it does not defend.
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, coefficient τi > 0, i = 1, 2.
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the estimated frequency of the opponent
using (11), (12).
4: Compute the best response using (4). (Note that the
result is always a completely mixed strategy.)
5: Randomly play an action vi(k) according to the best
response mixed strategy βi(r−i(k)).
6: end for
Algorithm 1: Fictitious Play with Time-Invariant Fre-
quency Update.
In TIFU-FP, both players employ Algorithm 1. The mean
dynamic of the evolution of TIFU-FP can be written as:
ri(k + 1) = (1− η)ri(k) + ηβi(r−i(k)), i = 1, 2. (14)
Note that Equations (14) are just evolution of the estimated
frequencies; the empirical frequencies still evolve in a time-
varying manner:
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
vi(k), i = 1, 2. (15)
The mean dynamic of empirical frequencies then can be
written as
qi(k + 1) =
k
k + 1
qi(k) +
1
k + 1
βi(r−i(k)), i = 1, 2. (16)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Nash Equilibrium of the Static Game
We start the analysis with the following result for the static
games given in Subsection II-A.
Proposition 1: The static 2-player 2-action game in II-A
with Assumption 1 and τ1, τ2 > 0 admits a unique Nash
equilibrium.
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Fig. 1. Static 2-player 2-action game in II-A with Assumption 1 and
τ1, τ2 > 0 - Best response mappings.
Proof: In what follows, let r1 ≡ (r11 , r21)T , r2 ≡
(r12 , r
2
2)
T
, β1(r2) ≡ (β
1
1(r2), β
2
1(r2))
T
, and β2(r2) ≡
(β12(r2), β
2
2(r2))
T
. We first use the Brouwer fixed point
theorem (see for example [4]) to prove the existence of
a Nash equilibrium, then use monotonicity of β11(r12) and
β12(r
1
1) to prove that the fixed point is unique. Here we write
β11(r
1
2) as a scalar-valued function of the only independent
variable r12 using the fact that r2 ∈ ∆(2), or r12 + r22 = 1.
Function β12(r11) is defined similarly. Also, as r1, r2 ∈ ∆(2),
a pair (r11 , r12) completely specifies the estimated frequencies
of the players. As seen from Equation (7), a Nash equilibrium
(r¯1, r¯2) is a fixed point of the best response mapping:
ri = βi(r−i), i = 1, 2.
It suffices to write this mapping as r = β(r), where r =
(r11 , r
1
2)
T
. Specifically, the mapping β can be detailed as:
r11 = β
1
1(r
1
2) =
(
σ
(
M1r2
τ1
))
1
=
e
{
1
τ1
[ar1
2
+b(1−r1
2
)]
}
e
{
1
τ1
[ar1
2
+b(1−r1
2
)]
}
+ e
{
1
τ1
[cr1
2
+d(1−r1
2
)]
} .
It can be seen that β11(r12) ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, we have
r12 = β
1
2(r
1
1) ∈ (0, 1).
Thus β is a transformation from [0, 1]2 to [0, 1]2, which
is a compact convex set. As both mappings β11 and β12
that constitute β are continuous, β is also a continuous
transformation. Using the Brouwer fixed point theorem, there
exists at least one fixed point r¯ such that r¯ = β(r¯), which is
a Nash equilibrium of the static game. Now we examine the
derivatives of β11(r12) and β12(r11) with respect to their own
independent variables:
dβ11(r2)
dr12
=
1
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]β11(r2)β
2
1(r2),
dβ12(r1)
dr11
=
1
τ2
[(e− f) + (h− g)]β21(r1)β
2
2(r1).
From Assumption 1, (a − c) + (d − b) < 0 and (e −
f) + (h − g) > 0. Thus β11(r12) is strictly decreasing in
r12 , and β12(r11) is strictly increasing in r11 . Now suppose that
there exist two distinct Nash equilibria, (r′1, r′2) and (r′′1 , r′′2 ).
Obviously, r′1 6= r′′1 , otherwise we will have r′2 = r′′2 , and
these two points coincide. Without loss of generality, assume
that r′1 < r′′1 . As β12(r11) is strictly increasing in r11 , we have
that r′2 < r′′2 . However, β11(r12) is strictly decreasing in r12 ,
so r′1 > r
′′
1 , which is contradictory to the initial assumption.
Thus the Nash equilibrium is unique.
We illustrate in Figure 1 the curves β11(r12) and β12(r11) with
the values of M1, M2, τ1, and τ2 as shown. The intersection
of these two curves is the Nash equilibrium of the static
game.
B. Estimated Frequencies and Empirical Frequencies
We present here two propositions for TIFU-FP: The first
shows the weights of each player’s actions in the estimated
frequency, and the second shows the relationship between
estimated frequencies and empirical frequencies.
Proposition 2: For k ≥ 2, the estimated frequencies in
TIFU-FP constructed using (11), (12) will satisfy
ri(k) = (1 − η)
k−1vi(0) + (1 − η)
k−2ηvi(1)
+(1− η)k−3ηvi(2) + . . .+ (1− η)ηvi(k − 2)
+ηvi(k − 1), (17)
where i = 1, 2.
Proof: This result can be proved using induction.
Proposition 3: In TIFU-FP, the empirical frequencies are
related to the estimated frequencies calculated using (11),
(12) through the following equation:
qi(k + 1) =
1
k + 1
(
2η − 1
η
ri(1) + ri(2) + . . .+ ri(k)
+
ri(k + 1)
η
)
, i = 1, 2. (18)
Proof: This result can be proved by writing the actions
of player Pi at times 0, 1, . . . , k in terms of the estimated
frequencies at times 1, 2, . . . , (k + 1).
C. Convergence Properties of the Mean Dynamic in TIFU-
FP
Theorem 1: Consider a TIFU-FP with Assumption 1 and
τ1, τ2 > 0. The mean dynamic given in Equations (14) is
asymptotically stable if and only if
η <
2
[(c−a)+(b−d)][(e−f)+(h−g)]
τ1τ2
r¯11 r¯
2
1 r¯
2
1 r¯
2
2 + 1
. (19)
Proof: As can be seen in Equations (14), this is a
deterministic nonlinear discrete-time time-invariant system.
We linearize the system at the fixed point and examine
stability properties of the linearized system using techniques
described in standard textbooks for nonlinear systems (e.g.,
[10]). Using the mean dynamic (14), where
r1(k) =
(
r11(k)
r21(k)
)
, r2(k) =
(
r12(k)
r22(k)
)
, (20)
it can be seen that a pair (r¯1, r¯2) that satisfies r¯i =
βi(r¯−i), i = 1, 2, is a fixed point of the system. Consider
the Jacobian matrix
J =
∂F (r)
∂r
=
(
∂F1(r)
∂r1
1
∂F1(r)
∂r1
2
∂F2(r)
∂r1
1
∂F2(r)
∂r1
2
)
.
We have that
∂F1(r)
∂r11
=
∂F2(r)
∂r12
= 1− η,
∂F1(r)
∂r12
= η
dβ11(r2)
dr12
.
Recall that β1(r2) = σ
(
M1r2
τ1
)
, where
M1r2
τ1
=
( 1
τ1
[ar12 + b(1− r
1
2)]
1
τ1
[cr12 + d(1− r
1
2)]
)
.
Thus
β11(r2) =
e
{
1
τ1
[ar1
2
+b(1−r1
2
)]
}
e
{
1
τ1
[ar1
2
+b(1−r1
2
)]
}
+ e
{
1
τ1
[cr1
2
+d(1−r1
2
)]
} .
Then
dβ11(r2)
dr12
=
1
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]β11(r2)β
2
1(r2),
∂F1(r)
∂r12
=
η
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]β11(r2)β
2
1(r2).
At the fixed point (r¯1, r¯2), we can write
∂F1(r¯)
∂r12
=
η
τ1
[(a− c) + (d− b)]r¯11 r¯
2
1 .
Similarly,
∂F2(r¯)
∂r11
=
η
τ2
[(e − f) + (h− g)]r¯12 r¯
2
2 .
Using the conditions for local stability, |µ1,2| ≤ 1, where
µ1,2 are eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, we finally have
the condition in Equation (19).
Remark 1: Although this theorem only mentions the
asymptotic stability of the estimated frequencies (of the mean
dynamic), once these estimated frequencies converge to the
Nash equilibrium, the best responses will also converge to
the Nash equilibrium, and so will the empirical frequencies
in the long run.
IV. ADAPTIVE FICTITIOUS PLAY
In this section we examine an adaptive FP algorithm
(hereafter referred to as AFP) based on FP with Time-
Invariant Frequency Update, where the step size η is piece-
wise constant and decreased over time. For the specific
implementation shown in Algorithm 2, the step size is either
kept fixed or halved, based on the variance of empirical
frequency in the previous time window.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We present in this section some simulation results for
TIFU-FP and AFP where the payoff matrices and entropy
coefficients are chosen to be
M1 =
(
1 5
3 2
)
, M2 =
(
4 1
3 5
)
, τ1 = 0.5, τ2 = 0.3.
The Nash Equilibrium of the static game is (0.79, 0.21)
and (0.47, 0.53). The local stability threshold (the RHS
of Equation (19)) is η0 = 0.2536. For simplicity, in the
graphs shown here, we only plot the first component of each
frequency vector.
A. Fictitious Play with Time Invariant Frequency Update
Some simulation results for the mean dynamic of TIFU-
FP (Equations (14)) are given in Figures 2 and 3. When
η = 0.25 < η0 = 0.2536, the estimated frequencies
are shown in Figure 2. The simulation results show that
both estimated frequencies and empirical frequencies (not
presented here due to space limitations) converge to the NE
as expected. When η = 0.26 > η0, however, the estimated
frequencies do not converge anymore. These simulations thus
confirm the theoretical result in Theorem 1. It is also worth
noting that the empirical frequencies in the case η = 0.26
still converge to the NE. Unlike the mean dynamic, a
stochastic TIFU-FP process (generated with Algorithm 1)
exhibits significant random fluctuations. The graph in Figure
4 shows the estimated frequencies of such a process where
we choose η = 0.01. However, the empirical frequencies
1: Given payoff matrix Mi, coefficient τi, i = 1, 2, initial
step size η0, minimum step size ηmin, and window size
T .
2: for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} do
3: Update the estimated frequency of the opponent,
r−i, using (11), (12).
4: Compute the best response mixed strategy
βi(r−i(k)) using (4).
5: Randomly play an action ai(k) according to the best
response mixed strategy βi(r−i(k)), such that the
expectation E [ai(k)] = βi(r−i(k)).
6: if at the end of a time window, mod (k, T ) = 0,
then
7: Compute the standard deviation of the estimated
frequencies (stdef) in the time window
[r−i(k − T + 1), . . . , r−i(k)] (using an unbiased
estimator):
mef(k) =
1
T
k∑
h=k−T+1
r−i(h)
stdef(k) =
√∑k
h=k−T+1 (r−i(h)−mef(k))
2
(T − 1)
8: if the computed stdef(k) has decreased compared
to previous time window then
9: Decrease step size: η = 0.5 η and
η = max(η, ηmin).
10: else
11: Keep step size η constant.
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
Algorithm 2: Adaptive Fictitious Play
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Fig. 2. Mean dynamic of FP with Time-Invariant Frequency Update -
Estimated Frequencies, η = 0.25, η0 = 0.2536.
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Fig. 3. Mean dynamic of FP with Time-Invariant Frequency Update -
Estimated Frequencies, η = 0.26, η0 = 0.2536.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 60000.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time step
Stochastic TIFU−FP − Estimated Frequencies, η=0.01, τ1=0.5, τ2=0.3
r1
1
r2
1
Fig. 4. Stochastic FP with Time-Invariant Frequency Update - Estimated
Frequencies, η = 0.01.
(whose graph is not shown here due to space limitations)
still converge to the NE .
B. Adaptive Fictitious Play
Some simulation results for adaptive FP are shown in
Figures 6 and 7. The payoff matrices and entropy coefficients
are the same as those in V-A. Initial and minimum step sizes
are chosen to be η0 = 0.1 and ηmin = 0.0005, respectively.
The time window for updating the step size is T = 50 steps.
The evolution of the empirical frequencies are depicted in
Figure 6, which shows that adaptive FP converges faster
than the stochastic FP with time-varying frequency update
(TVFU-FP) (Figure 5). We however remark that it is possible
to incorporate a decreasing coefficient into the step size in
TVFU-FP (which is originally 1/k) to make the TVFU-FP
process converge faster [11]. The update of the step size in
adaptive FP is shown in Figure 7. Note that when compared
to the step size 1/k in TVFU-FP, the step sizes in adaptive FP
are higher in the beginning and smaller afterwards, resulting
in aggressive convergence first and less fluctuation in the
stable phase.
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Fig. 5. Stochastic FP with Time-Varying Frequency Update - Empirical
Frequencies.
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Fig. 6. Adaptive Stochastic FP - Empirical Frequencies.
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Fig. 7. Adaptive Stochastic FP - Evolution of step size.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a time-invariant scheme
to estimate the frequency of the opponent’s actions in a two-
player two-action fictitious play process. We have proved
local stability of the unique Nash equilibrium for the mean
version of this FP dynamic. This frequency update scheme,
when used adaptively, allows players to converge faster to
the Nash equilibrium. For this two-player two-action FP,
conditions for global stability, if they exist, are yet to be
found. Also, having more than two possible actions for each
player is an intriguing research extension.
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